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Reunifying Privacy Law
Lior Jacob Strahilevitzt
In the years since Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeisproposed
a unified theory of invasion of privacy tort liability, American
information privacy law became increasingly fragmented and
decreasingly coherent. William Prosser's 1960 article, Privacy,
which heavily influenced the Restatement of Torts, endorsed and
hastened this trend toward fragmentation, which spreadfrom tort
law to the various statutory branches of information privacy law.
This Article arguesfor the reunification of informationprivacy law in
two connected ways. First,Prosser'sfragmentedprivacy tort should
be replaced with a unitary tort for invasion of privacy that looks to
the private or public nature of the information, the degree to which a
defendant's conduct violates existing social norms, and the social
welfare implications of the defendant's conduct. Second, the reunified
common law of torts should become the model for judicial
interpretationof various other branches of information privacy law,
such as the Freedom of Information Act's privacy provisions, the
Privacy Act, and the constitutional right of information privacy. The
Article examines how this reunificationproject can be accomplished,
why it is desirable,and whether it is consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court'smethodologicalguidance in privacy controversies.
The final section of the Article argues that the pending Supreme
Court case of NASA v. Nelson is an ideal vehicle for pushing the law
of informationprivacy back toward its relatively coherent andunified
origins. Nelson will be the first Supreme Court case in thirty-three
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years to confront squarely the question of whether the Constitution
protects a right to information privacy apart from the Fourth
Amendment context. Because the common law tort cause of action
and constitutionalaction involve similarharms and considerations,it
is appropriateto reconcile the presently divergent doctrines, though
this could be done in one of two ways. The most sensible approachto
reunification is to conclude, as the Sixth Circuit has, that there is no
such thing as a constitutional right to information privacy, and that
such rights are appropriately vindicated via statutory remedies. An
alternative approach would be to recognize the existence of a
constitutional right, as most circuit courts have, but to hold that the
elements of a constitutionalviolation mimic those associatedwith the
reunifiedprivacy tort.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1949, Germany was divided into two countries, East and West. Forty
years later, the Berlin Wall fell, and Germany was reunified a year after that.
In 1960, William Prosser wrote an enormously influential article dividing
the law of privacy into four components: intrusion, public disclosure,
appropriation, and false light. Fifty years later, American privacy law has
become far more fragmented than it was in Prosser's era.
We cannot lay all the blame for privacy law's fragmentation upon Prosser.
Privacy case law hardly seemed coherent when Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis found it. By the time they finished describing it, however, the law of
privacy fit together rather elegantly, which is part of what made their article so
important. Over the next several decades, courts began to embrace, in fits and
starts, their coherent vision of what the law could be. Yet there were always
cases that rejected their vision or, worse still, made a mess out of Warren-andBrandeis principles that the judges claimed to embrace. Prosser was the first
scholar to emphasize privacy law's fragmentation, and he lent it his influential
stamp of approval. Some contemporaries opposed his argument for
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fragmentation,' but it was Prosser who prevailed. Fifty years ago, Prosser
began in earnest a process of fragmentation that would create great internal
inconsistency in this body of law. Prosser's revolution in tort law preceded the
enactment of ad hoc privacy statutes that neither fit together, nor aligned with
the newly fragmented common law in a coherent way. We might suspect that
the common law fragmentation influenced the subsequent statutory
fragmentation, while recognizing that it would be unfair to lay at Prosser's feet
all of the blame for the mess that information privacy doctrine has become.
The division of Germany was not inexplicable. It resulted from tactical
decisions made by generals and politicians during the Second World War, the
power politics of the day, and the onset of the Cold War. But Germany's
division was irrational and unfortunate. Germans were united by a common
language, culture, history, system of governance, and by their collective
culpability for twentieth-century atrocities. Two Germanies did not represent a
stable equilibrium.
Nor was the fragmentation of American information privacy law
inexplicable-it was merely irrational. It has left us with a body of case law
whose contradictions are sometimes apparent, but often subtle. It is time to
move aggressively toward the reunification of American information privacy
law. This Article makes the case for returning the law to its 1890 origins-to an
era in which the law was sparse but coherent. I argue that the Supreme Court
has been directing the lower courts toward the reunification project, though in
ways subtle enough to have gone largely unnoticed by the lower courts. In a
presently pending case, the Court has a golden opportunity to be much more
blatant about endorsing the goal of returning coherence to information privacy
law, and this Article concludes by examining the two ways in which the Court
can decide NASA v. Nelson in a manner that promotes privacy law's
reunification.
Before turning to the case law in earnest, I do want to say a word about
the scope of my argument. I am not advocating here the unification of
information privacy and decisional privacy doctrine. Though some scholars
have argued that the Griswold line of cases shares important commonalities
with information privacy law,2 I believe the stark differences in the respective
analytical frameworks, stakes, historical pedigrees, and distributive contexts
1.

See, for example, the eloquent anti-fragmentation article, Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy

as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).

Bloustein argued that, by separating the unified invasion of privacy cause of action into four torts,
Prosser undermined the important conceptual work that Warren and Brandeis had done. He also
argued, contrary to Prosser, that a single societal interest-that of human dignity-undergirded all
invasion of privacy claims.
2. An inventive and well-executed example of scholarship in this vein is Neil M. Richards,
The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEo. L.J. 1087 (2006). An embarrassingly muddled and

misguided example of this sort of scholarship is Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and
the Boundaries ofSexual PrivacyAfter Lawrence v. Texas, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 671 (2005).
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dwarf the extant similarities between informational and decisional privacy.
Certainly, the differences are sufficient to warrant caution about the value of
trying to unify these disparate strands. At the same time, the Article also
accepts the argument, put forward at great length elsewhere, that information
privacy itself is a category with enough commonalities to render it a coherent
concept.3
The Article proceeds in seven parts. Part I argues for reunification within
privacy tort law itself. It argues that it was unnecessary for Prosser to divide
Warren and Brandeis's invasion of privacy tort into separate causes of action
for intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts. By
fragmenting the tort, Prosser and the Restatement robbed it of some of its
intuitive appeal. Perhaps as a result, courts sometimes subconsciously push
back against the Prosserian framework, and jumble together the elements of the
distinct tort.
Part II and subsequent parts advocate the reunification of privacy law
across doctrinal domains. Part II opens the broader case for reunification by
suggesting that the constitutional right to information privacy sometimes
overlaps substantially with privacy tort law. It is therefore a genuine puzzle
why the two overlapping causes of action should have divergent elements.
While there are some jurisdictions in which sovereign immunity and state tort
claims acts preclude the possibility of a suit against the state for invasion of
privacy harms, and that is largely true of the federal government because of
"due care" and "discretionary function" immunity under the Federal Torts
Claims Act, it is difficult to construct a persuasive case for why the
Constitution-as opposed to ordinary legislation-is the appropriate avenue for
providing plaintiffs with relief.
Part III advocates the reunification of privacy tort law with Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) privacy law. It shows that, while the Supreme Court
lacked a compelling justification for holding that "unwarranted invasions of
personal privacy" could have very different meanings in the FOIA and tort
contexts, the Court's most recent decision has suggested that it is appropriate to
look to privacy tort law to define an invasion of privacy under FOIA.
Part IV shows how to reconcile the Privacy Act with other aspects of
information privacy law. It offers a new defense of the Supreme Court's
leading privacy precedent, Doe v. Chao.4 The Article suggests that while
Chao's reading of the pertinent statutory language is somewhat strained on its
own terms, the decision may ultimately improve Privacy Act jurisprudence.
The Chao decision inoculates the government against a significant threat posed
by lower court decisions interpreting the Privacy Act in a manner that would
3. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy
as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REv. 119 (2004); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).

4.

540 U.S. 614 (2004).
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impose substantial liability on the government even for disclosing information
already readily accessible to the public. Chao also suggests that tort law
principles should color judicial interpretation of the Privacy Act itself,
providing the Court's most emphatic nudge in the direction of the reunification
project.
Part V proposes the replacement of Prosser's two primary privacy torts
with a single tort closer to what Warren and Brandeis envisioned. A unified tort
with three essential elements-privacy, highly offensiveness, and negative
effects on social welfare-offers a sensible analytical framework for analyzing
privacy harms involving publication or intrusion. The Part then suggests that a
reunified privacy tort might have an easier time grappling with the new privacy
problems being presented by novel technologies.
Part VI offers three reasons why the reunification of information privacy
law is desirable. More coherent law will lower the compliance costs faced by
firms and individuals, improve the quality of common law adjudication by
reducing uncertainty about how the law will treat particular controversies, and
help equalize the treatment of similarly situated parties.
Part VII concludes with the timeliest part of the Article. In October, the
Supreme Court heard oral argument in its first constitutional right to
information privacy case in thirty-three years. This Part brings to bear the
analysis from the previous parts of the Article to show how NASA v. Nelson can
become a vehicle for accelerating the rationalization and reunification of
privacy law. Given the mess that the lower courts have made of constitutional
right to information privacy doctrine, there are two viable paths for the Court to
take. The first approach would enhance coherence in privacy law by holding
that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of information privacy,
finding instead that the problems confronted in this category of cases are most
appropriately dealt with via garden variety tort or statutory remedies. The
second approach would regard the constitutional right to information privacy as
a gap-filler where political pathologies prevent legislative processes from
adequately vindicating privacy interests. If the constitutional right to
information privacy is to persist, it ought to more closely resemble privacy tort
law-and focus on the same three questions that are most relevant to tort
liability: whether the information is private, what the applicable social norms
are, and what social interests are vindicated by privacy and the absence of
privacy. For reasons explained in the Article, the first path seems more
attractive than the second, which in turns seems far superior to the continued
development of a sui generis constitutional right of information privacy.
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I.
POSNER VERSUS PROSSER
Let us begin with torts and the two most influential pieces of American
privacy scholarship. In their 1890 article, The Right to Privacy,s Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis described an undifferentiated cause of action for
interference with one's right to be let alone. Some of the examples they used in
their seminal article described the aggregation of information about individuals,
while some focused on the dissemination of said information.6
The authors did not distinguish between these two kinds of cases.
Tellingly, in a section of the article highlighting the limitations that had to be
imposed on tort liability for invasion of privacy, they embraced categorical
limitations. For example, if the cause of action for invasion of privacy came
into conflict with the people's right to receive information about matters of
legitimate public concern, privacy interests had to give way.
Fast forward seven decades: William Prosser, writing the second seminal
article on American privacy law, breaks the privacy torts into four components,
reasoning, plausibly, that distinct considerations animate the questions of when
information gathering and information publishing should be actionable, to say
nothing of the differences between the publication of true versus false
information and commercial versus noncommercial speech.8 The two torts that
receive the lengthiest treatment in Prosser's Privacy, and which seem most
closely tied to privacy itself, are intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure
of private facts.9 Although one tort deals with information gathering and the
other deals with information dissemination, the public disclosure tort largely
circumscribes the intrusion tort. If a defendant has engaged in public disclosure
of private facts, the odds are quite high that either the defendant or the
defendant's confederates have engaged in an intrusion upon seclusion. There
will be occasional exceptions to this rule of thumb, such as where the plaintiff
has voluntarily disclosed information to the defendant, who has disseminated it
without a legal basis for doing so.' 0
The claim that public disclosure generally circumscribes intrusion upon
seclusion is evident from an examination of the elements of the two torts.
Under the Restatement, intrusion upon seclusion requires (1) an intentional
intrusion into the (2) private affairs of another person, (3) in a manner highly
5.

(1890).
6.
7.
8.

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193

Id. at 295-96, 201-02.
Id. at 215.
See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960).

9. I do not address the misappropriation or false light torts here because I believe they
have rather little in common with either the two other privacy torts or the other bodies of
information privacy law considered herein.
10. See, e.g., Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941).
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offensive to a reasonable person." The public disclosure tort typically requires
(1) intentional disclosure by the defendant to the public, 12 (2) of private facts or
affairs concerning another person, (3) in a manner highly offensive to a
reasonable person and (4) not of legitimate public concern. 13 If a fact is private
for the purposes of the intrusion tort, it is private for the purposes of the public
disclosure tort, and vice versa. Along the same lines, the "highly offensive"
nature of the defendant's conduct must be manifest in either tort. Per Prosser,
the courts are to focus on the offensiveness of the information gathering in the
intrusion context and the information dissemination in the public disclosure
context, though this fine distinction often eludes them.
Notice that Prosser's public disclosure of private facts tort requires two
elements that are absent in the intrusion tort: publicity and nonnewsworthiness. An intrusion upon seclusion is not dependent on the defendant
sharing private information with anybody else. There are cases in which the
plaintiff recovers even though the defendant is the only person who was shown
to have learned the private information.14 But cases in which there is an
intrusion upon seclusion by one or two people, and no subsequent publicity, are
rarely brought because the damages resulting from such harm are usually low.
Non-newsworthiness ostensibly provides the most salient difference
between public disclosure and intrusion. When judges call a disclosure nonnewsworthy, they mean to say that it has no social value-an equivalence that
has become part of the doctrine.15 If the defendant publicizes newsworthy
information, then the plaintiff cannot recover for public disclosure, but if the
defendant gathers newsworthy information, the plaintiff might be able to
prevail on an intrusion claim. This critical distinction is part of black letter
doctrine,16 but it is not necessarily followed in practice.

11.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

652(B) (1977).

12. Some jurisdictions contravene the Restatement by recognizing negligent invasions of
privacy, both via intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts. Compare
Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702 (D.C. 2009) (no negligent invasion of
privacy liability), and Hudson v. S.D. Warren Co., 608 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Me. 1985) (no
negligent invasion of privacy liability), and Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380-81
(Md. Ct. App. 1997) (no negligent intrusion liability), with Spinks v. Equity Residential
Briarwood Apartments, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1043 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (no distinction
between intentional and negligent invasion of privacy), and Prince v. St. Francis-St. George
Hosp., 484 N.E.2d 265, 268-69 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (same). Texas law is currently split over
whether negligent invasion of privacy claims are permitted. See Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc.,
43 S.W.3d 40, 53 (Tex. App. 2001).
13.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652(D)

(1977).

14. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964).
15. See, e.g., Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n, 787 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing the newsworthiness factors as "the social value of the facts published" plus two other
factors that go more to the strength of the plaintiff's privacy interest).
16. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493-94 (Cal. 1998); Mitchell
v. Baltimore Sun, 883 A.2d 1008, 1023-24 (Md. Ct. App. 2005).
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Arguably the most famous pair of American privacy tort law opinions is
the Ninth Circuit's 1971 opinion in Dietemann v. Time and the Seventh
Circuit's 1995 opinion in Desnick v. ABC.17 In the privacy casebooks, Daniel
Solove and Paul Schwartz prominently pair the cases side by side, and Anita
Allen also compares them early in her casebook, though she devotes more
8
space to Dietemann.1
The cases involve similar facts. In Dietemann, undercover reporters
entered the home of a quack faith healer, gaining entry after telling Dietemann
that he had been recommended by a friend of his, the fictitious "Mr. Johnson."
Once inside, one of the journalists claimed to have a lump in her breast.
Dietemann purported to diagnose her ailment and treat it using various gadgets.
While Dietemann did not charge his patients as a matter of course, he did
accept contributions in return for his services. Dietemann was later arrested for
practicing medicine without a license and, in light of the photographs and
recordings made by the reporters, pled nolo contendere in the criminal
proceedings that preceded the tort action.19
Desnick involved journalists who hired actors to seek treatment in the
clinics of Dr. Desnick, an ophthalmologist. The actors' interactions with
medical personnel in the clinics were filmed surreptitiously. Although the
actors were perfectly healthy, Desnick's clinics recommended that several of
them undergo cataract surgery.20 The broadcast of the ABC story on Dr.
Desnick's practices evidently contributed to his leaving the profession.2 '
In Dietemann, the court held that the journalists for Life magazine had
invaded Dietemann's privacy. Not surprisingly, then, Desnick's lawyers relied
heavily on Dietemann in the Seventh Circuit. Writing for the court, Judge
Posner conceded the similarities, noting that Dietemann's home doubled as his
office and "[t]he parallel to this case is plain enough, but there is a difference.
Dietemann was not in business, and did not advertise his services or charge for
them. His quackery was private."22 Such analysis is not a satisfying basis for
distinguishing the case. Dietemann may have been less successful than
Desnick, but both were in the same business. Dietemann just had a different
business model: word of mouth advertising instead of billboards and print ads
(a sensible decision, given that Dietemann's business was illegal), and the

17. Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995); Dietemarn v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d
245 (9th Cir. 1971).
18.

ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 47-50 (2007); DANIEL J. SOLOVE &

PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 84-89 (3d ed. 2009).

19.

Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 245-47.

20. Id
21. Marilynn Marchione, Desnick Fined, Gives up Right to Practice for 2 Years,
Milwaukee J., April 8, 1995.
22. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353.
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Radiohead "pay what you want" business model instead of fixed prices. 23
Coffee shops sometimes charge customers whatever they say they are willing
to pay, but businesses they remain. 24 The differences between Dietemann and
Desnick are simply matters of degree.
In trying to provide a defense for Judge Posner's treatment of Dietemann,
my privacy law students almost invariably arrive at a pragmatic point with
which Posner presumably would sympathize, and which is suggested by early
portions of his opinion, especially its charming discussion of restaurant
critics. 25 Desnick presented a real threat to the public. He looked like a
legitimate medical professional, complete with a medical degree, fancy offices,
and a thriving practice. Desnick's imprimatur of authority might convince even
sophisticated consumers that they needed what were in fact unnecessary
surgeries. Dietemann was an entirely different matter. Only a fool would
believe in the healing power of Dietemann's quackery. And society's interest in
protecting the public from open and notorious charlatans was minimal
compared to its interest in encouraging uninhibited conversations.
As a pragmatic defense of the divergent results, this analysis makes sense,
but notice the subtext. If the difference between liability and dismissal in an
intrusion case is the extent to which the public benefits from the fruits of the
intrusion, then non-newsworthiness or something like it has crept into the
intrusion upon seclusion tort as a phantom element. There is no place in
Prosser's black letter intrusion upon seclusion law to consider the social
interest in rooting out charlatans. Yet that seems to be precisely what has
occurred in Desnick v. ABC, and it suggests the willingness of Judge Posner to
lend his voice to the project of reunifying information privacy law.
In the pages that follow, I will briefly sketch out some of the areas in
which different branches of the law of privacy have diverged. Many of these
divergences have gone unnoticed or unexplained by the courts involved in
creating them. I will suggest that the arguments for these divergences are quite
weak, and that (among the available models) privacy tort law is probably the
most sensible framework for dealing with privacy harms.
II.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION PRIVACY
In Whalen v. Roe,26 the Supreme Court assumed for the sake of argument
that the U.S. Constitution protected individuals against the improper collection,
aggregation, or disclosure of their private information. It then held that, even

23.

See Josh Tyrangiel, Radiohead Says: Pay What You Want, TIME, Oct. 1, 2007,

http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1666973,00.html.
24.

See, e.g., Amy Roe, A Kirkland Caf6 with No Prices, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007,

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2003558690_terrabiteO6e.html.
25. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1351-52.
26. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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under such an assumption, a New York program to track and analyze the
prescription of controlled substances did not violate the rights of patients whose
doctors prescribed them such medication. Shortly thereafter, the Court again
nodded in the direction of constitutional rights to information privacy, but ruled
that the public's interest in accessing President Nixon's presidential papers
outweighed whatever rights President Nixon may have had in his familial
communications. 27 The Court then lost interest in the constitutional right to
information privacy for three decades. As a result, Whalen and Nixon have
remained the only two cases in which the Court discussed the constitutional
right to information privacy in any detail, though that is about to change this
Term, as we shall see in Part VII. In neither case did the party asserting the
privacy right prevail.
Constitutional right to information privacy doctrine has been developed
significantly in the federal courts of appeals. Most of the appellate courts
assume that the Supreme Court intended to recognize a constitutional right of
information privacy in Whalen and Nixon, and have developed frameworks for
determining when that right has been violated. By contrast, the D.C. and Sixth
Circuits have questioned whether a constitutional right of information privacy
exists, given the poorly developed nature of the Supreme Court's
28
jurisprudence. Among the circuit courts that have recognized such a
constitutional right, the Third Circuit has worked out its case law most fully.
The leading Third Circuit case that establishes a framework for
determining when the constitutional right of information privacy has been
violated is United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.29 The Westinghouse

test looks at seven factors to determine whether such a right has been violated:
(1) the type of record requested, (2) the information it contains, (3) the potential
for harm resulting from nonconsensual disclosure, (4) the injury that disclosure
might cause to the relationship in which the information was recorded, (5) the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (6) the degree of
need for access to the information, and (7) whether there is an express statutory
command, public policy, or other interest favoring access to the information.30
Suffice it to say that a test with seven factors and no clear instruction about
how to weigh them leads to unpredictable results and is susceptible to
significant manipulation.
Where the government improperly collects or publishes a private citizen's
personal information, a question arises as to the proper cause of action. In some
jurisdictions, sovereign immunity prohibits an individual from suing the state
27. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
28. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
29. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980). Westinghouse has been cited more than one thousand
times as of 2010.
30.

Id. at 578.
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for invasion of privacy. In other jurisdictions, sovereign immunity imposes no
such bar because it has been waived via the state's applicable tort claims act.32
Federal cases typically construe the Federal Tort Claims Act as having waived
sovereign immunity in invasion of privacy tort suits against the federal
government, 3 3 though important exceptions apply where federal employees are
simply exercising due care to carry out federal policies. Moreover, several
states have enacted their own versions of the Federal Privacy Act, which may
provide an alternative basis for recovery. 34 Thus, the answer to the question of
whether an individual may sue his government for tortious invasion of privacy
depends on where he lives, which level of government he is suing, and who
within that government has engaged in the wrongful conduct.
The case law thus creates a strange set of circumstances. Suppose that a
government employee living in Ohio has his HIV status improperly disclosed
by his supervisor to all of his coworkers in contravention of government
policy-a fact pattern that has given rise to much litigation. Ohio permits suit
for intentional or negligent invasions of privacy. 3 5 Because Ohio is in the Sixth
Circuit, he cannot sue for a violation of his constitutional right to information
privacy. If he works for the federal government, he can sue for tortious
invasion of privacy. If he works for the state government, Ohio law gets quite
complicated. 36 Now transport that plaintiff to Washington D.C. He can
certainly sue his (federal) governmental employer under the Federal Tort
Claims Act-there is controlling D.C. Circuit authority on point." But he
probably cannot sue the same employer under the constitutional right to
information privacy-again, there is a D.C. Circuit opinion on point.38 If the
plaintiff lives in Nebraska, he can sue everybody under either a constitutional
theory or a tort cause of action-a state governmental employer is liable for
either a tort or constitutional violation, as is a federal governmental employer.39
31. See, e.g., Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 91 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); University of
Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767, 777 (Tex. App. 1999); Smith v.
City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 374 n.2 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
32. See, e.g., Wadman v. State, 510 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
33. See, e.g., Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir. 2003); Nurse v. United
States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 2000); Black v. Sheraton Corp., 564 F.2d 531, 540-41
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
34. See infra note 73.
35. See supra note 12.
36. There is no sovereign immunity for invasion of privacy suits when the act complained
of arises out of an employment relationship, though this rule may not apply to intentional
invasions of privacy. See Nungester v. Cincinnati, 654 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
There is also the added complication of the Ohio Privacy Act, which seems to waive sovereign
immunity for invasion of privacy claims brought under a state statute but not under the common
law. OHIO REv. CODE § 1347.10 (2009)
37. Black, 564 F.2d at 531.
38. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791-93
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
39. See, e.g., Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the
constitutional right to information privacy, but finding that disclosure by the City of Omaha Police
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The courts, by and large, have not devoted attention to the relationship
between the constitutional right of information privacy and the invasion of
privacy torts.40 Where the government is the defendant, the harm to the plaintiff
is the same regardless of the theory being pursued. Yet, the Westinghouse court
never explained why it was formulating a doctrine that deviates sharply from
privacy tort law. Perhaps the unstated rationale was something along the lines
of, "if four elements in a cause of action are good, seven must be even better."
But more is not better.
Consider a case like Doe v. SEPTA .41 According to the facts alleged in the
complaint, the plaintiffs immediate supervisor improperly discovered Doe's
HIV-positive status by obtaining the prescription medication information for
each employee under the employer's health plan and quizzing the employer's
42
medical director about what medications were prescribed for which illnesses.
The complaint further alleged that the plaintiffs coworkers shunned him
socially after the disclosure, though he remained employed. Applying Prosser's
public disclosure of private facts framework, the employer's conduct is almost
certainly actionable. Doe's HIV status was previously known only to medical
personnel at his place of employment, who were on a need-to-know basis. The
information was publicized at his workplace, resulting in his social
marginalization. The disclosure to coworkers was not newsworthy, because
they had no reason to know about his HIV status and he was a low-level
employee. And such disclosure was almost certainly highly offensive to a
reasonable person.4 3 All the elements of a tort would be satisfied. Nevertheless,
the court denied a constitutional recovery, holding that under the Westinghouse
test, the state's interest in controlling the costs of employee medical benefits
outweighed Doe's privacy interest. But the harm Doe was alleging had to do
with the disclosure of his HIV information to people who would be in no
position to make decisions about the employer's medical benefit coverage.
Applying a more complicated test, with more factors and more flexibility,
distracted the court from the essential issues raised by the plaintiff s complaint.
There have been some decisions that attempt to import tort law principles
into the doctrinal framework for the constitutional right to information
privacy." The counterpart to Judge Posner's reunifying opinion in Desnick is
Department of her unsuccessful application to become a police officer was not a constitutional
violation because it was not private information).
40. The Washington Supreme Court has held that, where cognizable common law invasion
of privacy claims and constitutional privacy claims are asserted simultaneously against a
governmental defendant for the same conduct, the court should resolve the common law claims
first and decline to reach the constitutional question if the plaintiff prevails under a common law
theory. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 342-43 & n.6 (Wash. 1998). A double recovery is
presumably impossible.
41. 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995).
42. Id at 1135-36.
43. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1994).
44. See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing common law
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Smith v. City of Artesia, in which the plaintiffs alleged that a local police
department had improperly circulated crime scene photographs depicting the
nude body of their deceased daughter. 45 The court began its analysis with
language that seems straightforward, but that subverts existing doctrine: "A
review of the scope of the common law right to privacy, although not
determinative of the constitutional right, can inform our understanding of the
concept of privacy and thereby assist us in evaluating plaintiffs' constitutional
claim."4 6 The court then reviewed common law precedents holding that the
deceased have no privacy rights, as well as constitutional rulings inconsistent
with the idea that someone could have a privacy interest in another individual.4 7
But by beginning with existing tort law doctrines, the law biased its opinions
toward uniformity, not fragmentation.
As with Desnick, however, important questions remain about how
reunification should proceed. I will argue in Part VII that privacy cases lack a
good theory of why constitutional law should supplement tort law as a remedy
for government intrusions and disclosures of personal information. An
alternative to having constitutional law reflect tort principles would reunify
privacy law by doing away with constitutional information privacy law.
Fascinatingly, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) jurisprudence, 48 like
the constitutional right to information privacy case law, provides important
examples of judicial efforts to reunify information privacy law. The Supreme
Court in National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish looked to

some common law precedents to determine whether Vince Foster's relatives
had a privacy interest in his autopsy photographs under FOIA's privacy
exemptions.4 9 The Court's unanimous opinion, to which we shall return
momentarily, cited four state court opinions granting next of kin privacy rights
in pictures of a loved one's corpse-including at least one case that cited City
of Artesia and other state court decisions finding no privacy rights under these
circumstances.so Yet the Supreme Court made no reference to any of the
contrary authority, no doubt leaving many readers with a false impression that
the state law precedents were uniform in recognizing a cause of action for next
of kin. Space constraints do not explain the omission because, for good
measure, the Court added in a discussion of familial burial rights in Antigone. 1

tort precedents to inform the analysis of whether the publication of an ex-offender's residential
address and employer under Megan's Law violates the constitutional right to information privacy).
45. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
46.

Id. at 374.

47. Id. at 374-75.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
49. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
50. Id. at 169 (citing Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 340-41 (Wash. 1998);
McCambridge v. Little Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 915 (Ark. 1989); and Bazemore v. Savannah
Hospital, 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930)).
51.

See id. at 168.
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We might admire the Favish Court's willingness to look to common law
precedents (and literature) for guidance while being disappointed at its
convenient selectivity in recognizing a privacy cause of action.
III.
FOIA JURISPRUDENCE AND REUNIFICATION

We will stay with FOIA as we explore further instances of privacy law's
fragmentation. FOIA was enacted not long after Prosser penned his article. The
legislative history concerning its privacy provisions was sparse. Critically, the
legislative history is almost entirely silent as to the meaning of the statutory
language in exemption 6 (permitting the withholding of "personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy") 52 and exemption 7(C) (permitting
the withholding of "records . . . compiled for law enforcement purposes, but

only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy").53
What does this similar language in the two provisions mean? It is natural
to analogize between the common law invasion of privacy and the statutory
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." If the disclosure of information
would constitute a tortious invasion of privacy had a private party engaged in it,
then the disclosure of the same information by the government would be
inappropriate under FOIA. Many state courts have construed the privacy
exemptions in their own states' versions of FOIA in precisely that way.54 But
writing in the Journalof Legal Studies not long after FOIA's enactment, Tony
Kronman wrote that there is nothing in the legislative history of FOIA to
suggest that, in adopting this language about unwarranted invasions of personal
privacy, Congress meant to import common law tort principles into the law
governing FOIA privacy.55 Although it did not cite this specific language in
Kronman's article, the Supreme Court in U.S. Department of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press cited other portions of Kronman's

article favorably and held that the question whether a disclosure was an
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
54. See, e.g., Perkins v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 635 A.2d 783, 788-91 (Conn. 1993);
Jordan v. Motor Vehicles Div., 781 P.2d 1203 (Or. 1989); State Emps. Assn. v. Dept. of Mgmt. &
Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. 1987); Child Prot. Grp. v. Cline, 350 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1986);
Harris v. Cox Enters., 348 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. 1986); Webb v. Shreveport, 371 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct.
App. 1979); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246, 252-54 (Wash. 1978); Indus. Found. v. Texas
Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
55.

Anthony T. Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J.

LEGAL STUD. 727, 738 n.40 (1980) ("Although the interests protected by FOIA's sixth exemption
are similar in many respects to those protected by privacy tort law, neither the legislative history
of the act nor its judicial interpretation reveals any reliance on (or familiarity with) the doctrinal
contours of the privacy tort .... .").

2010]

REUNIFYING PRIVACYLAW

2021

invasion of personal privacy under FOIA's exemption 6 was not the same as
the question of whether the disclosure would be a tortious invasion of

privacy. 5 6
Kronman's language has been misinterpreted to imply that FOIA privacy
and tort privacy should diverge. It is true that there is nothing in the legislative
history to suggest that FOIA privacy should track tort privacy. But it is also
true that there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that FOIA privacy
should not track the common law. The pertinent question, then, is whether there
is any principled basis for thinking that Congress wanted the courts to make up
a body of FOIA privacy law that would be inconsistent with privacy tort law.
It is difficult to provide a satisfying explanation for the divergence. It may
well be that the law thinks about private speech and government speech
differently. From an individual liberty perspective, constraining a private actor
from speaking entails an infringement of First Amendment freedoms, but there
is no constitutional problem with the federal government constraining its own
speech. That dynamic suggests that we might view FOIA privacy and tort
privacy differently, perhaps removing non-newsworthiness as a consideration
in FOIA privacy disputes.58 But notice that from the perspective of the data
privacy subject, it does not matter whether the government or a private actor is
initially disseminating the damaging private information. The FOIA requester
often wants to publish the information that the government turns over to him,
so the reputational and psychological harm from the disclosure will be
equivalent. From an Alexander Meiklejohnian perspective, keeping pertinent
information about public affairs out of the hands of the public is equally
problematic, regardless of the information's source. Within that framework,
one should view public disclosure by the government in response to a FOIA
request and public disclosure by a private party in the same terms.
Another plausible basis for distinguishing between FOIA privacy and tort
privacy focuses on ex ante information gathering rather than ex post
information dissemination. It may be the case that people are only comfortable
with turning information over to the government if there are strong privacy
protections built into FOIA. 59 In the absence of such a regime, the government
could be starved of data about individuals, which would compromise the state's
ability to, for example, run effective criminal justice, education, traffic safety,
or health care systems. On the other hand, one can make similar arguments
56. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762
n.13, 772 n.20 (1989). The Court did not cite Kronman's footnote 40 or any other authority for the
proposition that FOIA privacy law could deviate from privacy tort law.
57. There is, of course, a body of constitutional law compelling citizen access to
government information. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional
Law, and Platformsfor JudicialIntervention, 53 UCLA L. REv. 909 (2006).

58. More generally, we might say that certain normative frameworks will be hostile to
some aspects ofthe reunification project.
59. A robust Privacy Act may be part and parcel of the same concern.
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about the importance of enabling people to trust private actors-be they
friends, coworkers, lovers, or private firms that perform essential functions like
helping people find information, insuring them against medical costs,
disseminating entertainment content to them, or educating them. In short, while
ex ante arguments about facilitating information disclosure to government
provide a plausible explanation for treating tort privacy and FOIA privacy
differently, one would want to construct a difficult empirical and normative
argument to support such a distinction. To date, neither courts nor
commentators have made such a case.
A more serious objection to treating tort and FOIA privacy similarly
builds on FOIA's nature as a mandatory disclosure regime-if none of the
FOIA exceptions apply, then a requested document must be disclosed. But the
government has unique powers to collect information, thanks to its ability to
subpoena documents, conduct wiretaps, access taxpayer information, and so on.
The private sector lacks these powers, and the information it possesses
therefore might not pose the same level of threat to individuals. This argument
has force, but it is counterbalanced by several factors, including the private
sector's greater facility with data analysis thanks to reduced agency problems,
and Americans' greater willingness to disclose personal information to private
entities than to the state. 60 Much of the information in the government's hands
is information that high-level policy makers do not realize exists, that is poorly
organized, and that may even be difficult to locate. In the private sector, where
knowledge is money and money is everything, the incentives to analyze the
data that a firm does possess in ways that add value to the firm's bottom line
are much more pronounced.6 1
To be sure, the private sector in the United States is not bound by any
equivalent of FOIA. If you ask Goldman Sachs to provide you with information
about its operations, it can say no to your request-or ignore you completelywithout having to provide a privacy rationale or any other justification. But that
contrast with FOIA reflects a feature, not a bug. The Freedom of Information
Act is a mandatory disclosure regime precisely because Congress was
concerned that, in its absence, too much information pertinent to the conduct of
government was being kept from the citizenry. To suggest that the FOIA
privacy standard ought to be substantially stricter than the tort privacy statute is
to privilege one of FOIA's subsidiary purposes (protecting privacy) at the
expense of its overarching purpose (promoting disclosure of information
60. In Europe, the private sector is regarded as the much more significant threat to personal
privacy, and Europeans may be much more comfortable sharing information with the state than
they would be sharing the same information with Google or Microsoft. See generally James Q.
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151

(2004).
61. The public sector institutions that most closely resemble the private sector-the law
enforcement and national security apparatuses-are the ones that can most easily resist FOIA
disclosure requests under the statute.
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pertinent to the operations of government).
The problematic decision to deviate from privacy tort principles in
articulating FOIA privacy law likely has been outcome-determinative in both of
the Supreme Court's principle FOIA privacy precedents. In Reporters
Committee, the Court held that CBS could not use a FOIA request to obtain rap
sheet information about a defense contractor who had engaged in dealings with
a corrupt congressman.62 Under privacy tort law, a private party's publication
of a story disclosing the contents of a rap sheet that had fallen into private
hands would have been lawful. The publication of such information would have
informed the public about a matter of great public concern--corruption in
Congress and in Department of Defense procurement. As a result of the Court's
ruling in Reporters Committee, CBS news was given a choice between
abandoning an extremely newsworthy investigative story and expending very
substantial reporter resources to try to reverse engineer the contents of a rap
sheet. Imposing such a burden on the press chills legitimate and valuable news
reporting in much the same way as defamation liability. But there is no FOIA
equivalent to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. By rejecting privacy tort law's
principles, Reporters Committee arrives at a result quite hostile to free speech
interests. The outcome surely would have distressed Warren and Brandeis. 4
Similarly, the result in Favish probably would have been different under
privacy tort principles. In Favish, the Court held that FOIA's privacy
exemptions justified the withholding of photos taken of Vince Foster's body as
it lay in a public park following Foster's suicide.65 As stated earlier, the tort
case law is split with respect to next of kin's privacy interests in autopsy
photographs and their ability to recover for public disclosure of private facts.
But in none of the pre-Favish common law cases that found tort liability did the
decedents die in a public place. Their bodies were photographed in private
residences, medical examiner's offices, and hospital operating rooms.66 As a
general matter, the privacy tort case law is hostile to the notion that someone
badly injured in public has a privacy interest in visual depictions of their

62. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989).
63. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that actual malice is
required for public officials to prevail in libel suits).
64. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 214-15.
65. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 157 (2004).
66.

See cases cited supra note 50. A very recent case, Catsouras v. Dep't of Cal. Highway

Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), does recognize a tort action by next of kin for
the dissemination of images of a decedent taken after the car accident that killed her. The accident
evidently occurred on a public street. The court relied heavily on Favish in sustaining the cause of
action, which is a sensible way to try to reunify privacy law. See id. at 870-72. The intermediate
appellate court should be faulted, however, for failing to consider the competing argument that,
under the California Supreme Court's opinion in Shulman, the public place where the accident
occurred may have eliminated the victim's expectations of privacy.
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injuries. In the case of a suicide victim who chose to kill himself in a public
place, that resistance would have to be stronger still. Moreover, while the
Supreme Court held that the interest in releasing the Foster autopsy
photographs was not particularly high, given the similar conclusions to multiple
independent inquiries into his suicide, such photographs likely would still count
as newsworthy under Prosserian tort law's binary framework.
Even taken on its own terms, the Favish Court's conclusion that the
autopsy photographs were made less newsworthy as a result of the previous
investigations is unsatisfying. Favish requested the photographs because he
believed that there was a conspiracy to cover up Foster's murder, and the Court
noted that multiple separate investigations had debunked that murder theory.
But suppose Favish had sought the release of the photographs to suggest
different wrongdoing by the government-not its murder of a high government
official, but its wasteful expenditure of resources on multiple investigations of
what was obviously an open-and-shut case of suicide. Under the reasoning of
the Favish opinion, a person seeking the disclosure of the autopsy photographs
under such a theory ought to be able to prevail under the Court's balancing
approach. If we take the reasoning of the opinion seriously, you or I should be
able to obtain the Foster autopsy photos if we just recharacterize the
government's misconduct.
In short, the Supreme Court has made errors in both of its landmark FOIA
privacy precedents and those are mistakes that would have been averted had
FOIA privacy doctrine simply followed well-established privacy tort principles.
The incoherence of privacy law is not just a problem for those who would like
to see conceptual clarity in the law. It also results in outcomes that impede
significant speech interests as well.

IV.
DISCLOSURE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT
The federal Privacy

Act68

is in some ways the most ambitious piece of

federal legislation in the domain of information privacy. It is certainly the most
comprehensive law that regulates the processing and dissemination of
information that the government collects about individuals. 6 9 The two events
precipitating the enactment of the Privacy Act in 1974 were the abuses of the
Watergate era, in which the Nixon administration used the federal
government's access to personal information to identify and intimidate its
political opponents, and the development of the Fair Information Practices, a
comprehensive framework of privacy principles that were designed to help
privacy law meet the new challenges posed by computerization.
67.
68.

Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector

69.
Regulation in the United States, 80 IowA L. REV. 553, 583 (1995).
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The key language in the Privacy Act prohibits agencies of the federal
government from disclosing "any record which is contained in a system of
records .

.

. to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written

request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the
record pertains." 70 The law defines "record" as "any item, collection, or
grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency,
including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical
history, and criminal or employment history. 7'' The legislative history of the
Privacy Act focuses heavily on the imperative that the government prevent the
disclosure of "personal information," and some courts have concluded that only
"personal information" can constitute a "record" under the Privacy Act. 72 But
whereas state versions of the Privacy Act, like the legislative history of the
federal Privacy Act, refer to "personal information" associated with data
privacy subjects, the federal legislation's text refers simply to "records." 7 3
Some federal courts have taken this word choice to mean that the law protects
individuals against governmental disclosure of information that is by no means
private, the title of the statute notwithstanding.
The leading on-point case is Quinn v. Stone.74 That case involved two
individuals who went hunting on property belonging to an Army depot where
both were employed. This hunting was permitted, as long as the hunters first
provided their hunting license numbers, names, addresses, phone numbers, and
permit numbers when signing into a hunting registry. After signing in and
beginning their hunt, the plaintiffs came under suspicion of illegally evading
regulations concerning the number of deer that could be killed in a season. A
wildlife conservation officer was contacted to investigate whether any illegal
conduct had occurred. In the course of his investigation, the officer examined
the hunting registry and also obtained one of the plaintiffs time cards to
investigate a (false) allegation that she had been hunting on a day when her
employer thought she was at work.76 The officer's investigation eventually
concluded that the plaintiffs' conduct had been lawful, and the investigation
was closed. The plaintiffs then sued the Secretary of the Army for violating the
Privacy Act by disclosing the information on the hunting registry to the
conservation officer.

70.
71.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4).

72. Houston v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 494 F.Supp. 24, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1979).
73. For a nice comparison of federal and state language, see PrivacyActs of the States and
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/notice/
GENERAL,
ATTORNEY
the
United States, TEXAS
privacytable.htm (last visited March 22, 2010).
74. Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 128-29.
76. Id. at 130.
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One of the defendant's principal claims was that it could not be liable for
disclosing to an investigator information-an address and telephone number
here-that was "readily accessible to the public."77 One of the plaintiffs had
listed his address and phone number in the local telephone directory.
Remarkably, the court held that while there could be no liability under the
Privacy Act if the investigator already knew the plaintiffs phone number and
address, liability was appropriate if the information was merely "readily
accessible to the public."78 The court wrote:
Appellees have cited to this court no case that stands for the
proposition that there is no violation of the Act if the information is
merely readily accessible to the members of the public (such as in the
local telephone book) and our research has discovered none. We doubt
if any court would so hold. To do so would eviscerate the Act's central
prohibition, the prohibition against disclosure.... To define disclosure
so narrowly as to exclude information that is readily accessible to the
public would render superfluous the detailed statutory schemes of
twelve exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure. We conclude that
making available information which is readily accessible to members
of the public is a disclosure under [the Act] . . . .79
In short, the court said, the temporal sequence of the disclosure matters a great
deal. If, upon leaming information that might cause him to believe that the
plaintiff may have behaved unlawfully, the investigator had looked up the
plaintiffs address in the phone book, there would be no Privacy Act violation
as a result of the Army's subsequent disclosure of the address to the
investigator. But the Army's disclosure violated the Act because it happened
before the investigator had done this rudimentary detective work.
Such reasoning is difficult to square with the law's general attitude toward
harm and causation. One way of understanding information "readily accessible
to the public," is to define such information as information whose disclosure is
inevitable to interested parties. By being placed on notice that the plaintiffs
may have broken the law, the wildlife conservation officer almost certainly
would have had reason to obtain the telephone number and address of the
investigation's targets so that he could seek to question them about their
conduct. In public disclosure tort law specifically, and tort law in general, the
core inquiry is whether, in the absence of the defendant's actions, the
information at issue would have remained private.80
There is no good theory for why the Privacy Act should either compensate
plaintiffs or punish the government for the disclosure of information that is

77. Id. at 134.
78. Id.
79. Id at 134 (footnote omitted).
80. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919,
935 (2005).
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already readily accessible to the public. One wants to deter the government
from disclosing information where such disclosure is harmful to individuals,
but not to deter a government disclosure that harms no one. While there may be
a case for implementing the FOIA standard from Reporters Committee-the
government should not be permitted to disclose "practically obscure"
information about an individual-the case against such disclosure collapses
when the information at issue is not even practically obscure.
The rule in Quinn v. Stone simply engenders absurd results. The Army
must pay damages for the disclosure to an investigator of the address and
telephone number of a person of interest in a criminal investigation. In Pilon v.
United States Department of Justice,8

the D.C. Circuit held that the

government could be liable under the Privacy Act for disclosing information to
an individual that the individual already knew based on his previous
employment experience with the agency that had released the information. The
court arrived at this conclusion after devoting seven pages to the interpretive
question of whether the government "discloses" information to an individual
when it releases to that individual information he already knows.82 The court
noted that dictionary definitions for "disclose" sometimes encompass the
dissemination of information to people already in possession of it, provided a
smattering of fairly weak examples, and observed that in several places the
statute seems to refer to disclosure and dissemination interchangeably.83 But
while considering the plain meaning and legislative purpose of the Privacy Act,
the court never once thought to consider the title of the statute. Under no
version of privacy law-save the Privacy Act after Quinn and Pilon-can
information be private with respect to someone who already knows it. As the
court acknowledged, the Act emerged from "a late-session congressional
compromise, with several of its central terms lacking express definition."84 It is
plausible, likely even, that few in Congress read the bill's provisions. But
surely all of them knew the law's name. Yet the Pilon court announced itself
unwilling to reject even the extraordinary proposition that the disclosure of "a
document that has already been fully aired in the public domain through the
press or some other means" could violate the Privacy Act.ss
The result in Pilon is not indefensible. A sensible argument for Pilon
would focus on the ability of the information recipient to disseminate that
information to third parties. Thus, a former or present government employee
might be barred by ethical or contractual obligations from disclosing
information she learned while working for the government, but if she received
the duplicative information lawfully from another agent of the government via
81.

73 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1117-24.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1123 n.10.
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FOIA, her ability to pass the information on to the press or a third party could
be constitutionally protected. Read in this manner, Pilon might be part and
parcel of the Reporters Committee reasoning that information can still be
private when it is merely practically obscure. Having said that, it is very hard to
construct a persuasive argument for the correctness of both Pilon and Quinn.
Now we are talking about information to which the press and the public already
have easy access. The former government employee who wants to share
information learned during her employment can do so easily via public
documents. The concern about a former employee "laundering" previously
private information into public information disappears completely.
To summarize the discussion so far, the federal appellate courts have
made a mess of things. Seizing on an open-ended word choice in the legislation
while ignoring much of its legislative history, the courts have read the word
"privacy" out of the "Privacy Act." The result is an unusual situation in which
the federal government may be liable for disclosures that harm no one. This
would not be a problem were a plaintiff's recovery limited to actual damages
under the statute. The absence of harm would entail the absence of a remedy.
But the Privacy Act contains a minimum statutory damages provision, which
reads as follows:
In any suit brought under the provisions of. . .this section in which the
court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual
in an amount equal to the sum of (A) Actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the
refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery
receive less than the sum of $1,000; and
(B) The costs of action together with reasonable attorney fees as
determined by the court.86
Now we see the potential for difficulties. The government might intentionally
release a record containing exclusive information that is already readily
accessible to the public. No harm would ensue, but the government would still
be liable for $1,000 per violation. In the case of a large-scale disclosure
concerning many individuals, the government could face enormous liability.
Enter Doe v. Chao, the Supreme Court's most significant decision
concerning the Privacy Act.87 In Chao the Court had to construe the law's
minimum damages provision. Doe was a worker who applied to the Labor
Department for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. His application for
benefits asked for his Social Security number, which the Department then used
as the reference number for Doe's claim. As a result, the number was sent to
groups of other claimants and their lawyers. Doe's number, along with those of

86.
87.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (2006).
540 U.S. 614 (2004).
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his fellow plaintiffs, was compromised, subjecting them to a heightened risk of
identity theft. Yet, when the case was litigated, Doe had not been victimized by
identity thieves. Rather, Doe asserted that he was "greatly concerned and
worried" about the improper disclosure of his Social Security number." He did
not corroborate this testimony with evidence of medical treatment, out-ofpocket expenditures to remedy the situation, or other documented loss of
income.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that Doe was not entitled to the $1,000
statutory minimum. The Court read subsection (a) of the statute to entitle only
someone who had sustained "actual damages" to recover the $1,000
minimum.89 Along the way, the Court held that subsection (a)'s reference to a
"person entitled to recovery" meant someone who had sustained "actual
damages." 90 The clear implication of the Court's analysis is that if Doe had
spent, say, $20 for a credit-monitoring identity theft program, he would be
entitled to at least $1000 in damages, but because he could not demonstrate
such expenditures he was entitled to nothing. That seems odd. Two very
interesting passages from Justice Souter's majority opinion try to parry this
concern:
Doe's manner of reading "entitle[ment] to recovery" as satisfied by
adverse effect caused by intentional or willful violation . . . is at odds

with the traditional understanding that tort recovery requires not only
wrongful act plus causation reaching to the plaintiff, but proof of some
harm for which damages can reasonably be assessed.
Doe also suggests there is something peculiar in offering some
guaranteed damages, as a form of presumed damages not requiring
proof of amount, only to those plaintiffs who can demonstrate actual
damages. But this approach parallels another remedial scheme that the
drafters of the Privacy Act would probably have known about. At
common law, certain defamation torts were redressed by general
damages but only when a plaintiff first proved some "special harm,"
i.e., "harm of a material and generally of a pecuniary nature." . . .
Because the recovery of presumed damages in these cases was
supplemental to compensation for specific harm, it was hardly
unprecedented for Congress to make a guaranteed minimum
contingent upon some showing of actual damages, thereby avoiding
giveaways to plaintiffs with nothing more than "abstract injuries."9
Fascinating stuff. The Court is telling us that tort principles will aid
interpretation of the Privacy Act's ambiguous minimum statutory damages
language. Yes, the hypothetical Doe who signs up for identity theft protection
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 618.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 621, 625-26 (citations omitted).
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with Equifax would be treated differently than the real Doe, but the same would
be true under ordinary tort principles of recovery. As with FOIA, there is
nothing in the Privacy Act to say whether tort law conceptions influenced the
legislators who voted for the bill, but the majority finds the arguments for
coherence attractive nevertheless. Read together, Chao and Favish stand for a
kind of "coherence canon," whereby statutes are interpreted by the courts so as
to minimize any conflicts with common law developments in closely related
subject matters.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Chao makes several compelling statutory
interpretation arguments. As she pointed out, the majority's construction of the
language renders the statute's "adverse effect" element for liability superfluous,
and it converts the law's "shall be liable" into "may be liable." 92 The dissent is
quite effective in explaining that similar language in other federal statutes had
been construed to permit recovery of minimum damages without a showing of
pecuniary harm. 93 There were, moreover, strong arguments that the dissent did
not raise too. Notice, for example, that Congress used "but" in between the
clause entitling plaintiffs to "actual damages" and the clause setting a $1,000
floor for recoveries. 9 4 If the majority is right about what Congress meant then
"and," rather than "but," seems the appropriate conjunction. For these reasons,
I was one of sixteen privacy law scholars who signed an amicus brief urging
the Court to rule in Doe's favor. No academics doing work in the area
submitted amicus briefs in support of the Labor Department's interpretation.
The majority's statutory interpretation arguments are not demonstrably wrong,
but when the respective opinions are placed side by side it is very surprising
that Justice Souter's is the one that garnered more votes.
I still think the Court got it wrong in Doe v. Chao, but I now believe I
understand what the majority may have been attempting to do. We can
understand Chao as another exemplary "reunifying privacy law" opinion-akin
to Desnick or City ofArtesia. Faced with the prospect of crippling liability for
government disclosures of information that was already readily accessible to
the public, the Court fixed the problem in a "second best" way. Rather than
overruling Quinn directly, the Court took the wind out of its sails. Where
information is already readily accessible to the public, the person whom that
information concerns cannot show harm from the government disclosure. And
absent a showing of harm, there is no incentive to bring a suit. Chao, in short, is
the second wrong that made a right.

92.

Id. at 631 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

93.

Id. at 639-41.

94. See supra text accompanying note 86.
95. See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Doe v. Chao 540 U.S. 614 (2004) (No. 02-1377), 2003 WL 22070504. That was the
only amicus brief the author has ever signed, and the author has now learned his lesson.
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So far, Chao has had little impact on the Quinn-Pilon line of doctrine.
Recent cases continue to cite those precedents as good law as if nothing has
changed.96 But things have changed, and dramatically. The Supreme Court has
told us that tort principles concerning harm and damages comprise an essential
part of the appropriate judicial methodology for interpreting the Privacy Act.
So if principles from a pocket of tort law like defamation may prove decisive in
helping judges decipher the meaning of ambiguous terms, principles from
privacy tort law must be all the more germane. Yet Quinn and Pilon are not just
out of step with privacy tort principles-they are in a completely different
galaxy.97 Properly understood, Chao points toward the radical revision of
Privacy Act jurisprudence. But almost no one has noticed.
There is a recent and encouraging exception. In June, the D.C. Circuit
handed down Armstrong v. Geithner,98 a Privacy Act case that used tort
principles-and even privacy tort scholarship-to decide whether the Privacy
Act protected an individual who was seeking to transfer from one part of the
federal bureaucracy to another. Someone with knowledge of an ongoing
investigation of Armstrong by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (TIGTA) (his old employer) informed six employees at the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (his new employer) that
TIGTA was investigating Armstrong for misconduct. After learning of the
probe, the USDA postponed Armstrong's start date indefinitely. 99
Armstrong could not prove that the anonymous person who leaked the
information to the USDA had retrieved the information from a "system of
records," but he offered the court a tort-based res ipsa loquitur argument,
suggesting that the information could only have come from a source of
information protected by the statute.100 Writing for the court, Judge Ginsburg
applied tort-style causation analysis to determine whether the Privacy Act had
been violated, concluding that no violation had occurred. 0 '
For good measure, the court then added an alternative basis for dismissing
Armstrong's suit. It noted that Armstrong himself had disclosed aspects of the
investigation to eight people-his wife, five coworkers, and two people outside
96. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Harvey, 493 F. Supp.2d 1, 16 n.29 (D.D.C. 2007).
97. There must be some logical stopping point to this argument, where tort law ceases to
shape Privacy Act interpretation. The clearest example of this is the law's reference to criminal
history information as information that plainly constitutes a record, the disclosure of which may
violate the Privacy Act. See supra text accompanying note 71. Although this was not true at the
time the Privacy Act was enacted, it is now well established that the publication of someone's
prior criminal history cannot be tortious under American law. Compare Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the publication of an eleven-year-old criminal
conviction may be tortious), with Gates v. Discovery Comnmc'ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004)
(holding that Briscoe must be overruled in light of subsequent U.S. Supreme Court precedents).
98. 608 F.3d 854 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
99. Id. at 856.
100. Id. at 857.
101. Id. at 859.
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TIGTA. 102 Citing a law review article that proposes a framework for
determining when such disclosures waive a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
under privacy tort law, the court concluded that one of these disclosures might
well have started the causal chain that resulted in the information's disclosure
to TIGTA.o 3 Noting that as an empirical matter, disclosures of sensational
information were likely to spread like wildfire through a workplace, the court
concluded that "Armstrong's disclosures to seven professional contacts could
easily account for certain details finding their way into the TIGTA rumor
mill."1 0 4 Perhaps the radical revision of Privacy Act jurisprudence hinted at in
Chao is now underway.
V.
A FRAMEWORK FOR REUNIFYING PRIVACY LAW
To say that privacy law should be reunified along the lines described by
Warren and Brandeis is not to suggest that in 1890 they gave us everything the
law needs to navigate the privacy challenges arising in contemporary society.
Nor do I wish to suggest that privacy law should become fixed or, worse,
stagnant. The Warren and Brandeis vision of privacy law was one that
expressed a strong common law sensibility, and one that was optimistic about
the potential for scholarship to lend coherence to the common law's path. In the
pages that follow I will sketch out a general vision of what a reunified privacy
law framework might look like, and how it might address current controversies
in privacy law.
The first step is to thank Prosser for his attention to and insights about
privacy law, and the second is to turn our backs on basically everything he
sought to accomplish. There is no reason why the torts for intrusion upon
seclusion and public disclosure of private facts should look different from each
other. The keys to each tort are whether the defendant's actions intruded upon
private information and whether the defendant's conduct violated existing
norms of social conduct-in other words, whether the conduct was highly
offensive to a reasonable person. We should add to this inquiry the basically
welfarist balancing test that Warren and Brandeis embraced in 1890 and that
Judge Posner snuck back into the law in Desnick: Is the gravity of the harm to
the plaintiff's privacy interest outweighed by a paramount public policy
interest, such as the need to protect patients against quack doctors or the public
purse against Medicare fraudsters?
To be sure, two important distinctions remain between intrusion harms
and public disclosure harms. First, we may expect that the damage to the
plaintiff is greater in cases involving a public disclosure, precisely because

102.
103.
104.

Id. at 861.
Id. at 860-61 (citing Strahilevitz, supra note 80, at 919).
Id. at 861.
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reputational harms compound dignitary harms, and the reputational harms in a
pure intrusion case are necessarily limited. This is a principle that the law
already recognizes, and it shows up in lower damage awards for cases
involving no publication of the private facts. Indeed, jurisdictions like Illinois
and Michigan have practically eliminated "publication" as an element of
Prosser's publication of private facts tort by finding liability where the
defendant disseminated private information to a small number of individuals
who have a "special relationship" with the plaintiff-another reunifying thread
in privacy tort law. 105
The second distinction seems more fundamental but is as neatly
resolvable. The First Amendment implications of limiting a defendant's ability
to disclose facts are more troublesome than the implications of limiting a
defendant's ability to gather facts. Although this distinction is not immune to
criticism, let us assume its correctness for the sake of argument. The fact that
the First Amendment may constrain the state's ability to impose damages on
those who publish private facts does not mean that the underlying tort causes of
action need to look any different. Rather, it simply means that once tort liability
is found, the courts should conduct an independent inquiry as to whether
imposing liability on that defendant (or class of defendants) will undermine
fundamental expressive or self-governance interests. Indeed, such a textured
inquiry better coheres with First Amendment doctrine than does the public
disclosure tort's binary newsworthiness/non-newsworthiness distinction.
By introducing non-newsworthiness as an element of the public disclosure
tort, Prosser brought First Amendment interests into the tort, yet this is not
obviously where they belong. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress sometimes involves hurtful speech that is nevertheless of legitimate
concern to the public. This situation has not prompted tort scholars to develop
multiple versions of the tort. Rather, courts simply consider the First
Amendment implications of imposing liability through a separate inquiry when
required to do so.106
Returning privacy tort law to the 1890s-era status quo is attractive, and it
does not require the replacement of Prosser's framework with element-less
torts. We can embrace a reformed version of Warren and Brandeis's unified
tort for invasion of privacy. Such an invasion occurs when the defendant
infringes upon (1) the defendant's private facts or concerns, (2) in a manner
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) engages in conduct that
engenders social harms that exceed the associated social benefits.
105. Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977); Miller v. Motorola, 560 N.E.2d
900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
106. The Supreme Court has allowed the states to leave intact the elements of a state law
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action but held separately that the First
Amendment requires public figure plaintiffs to demonstrate actual malice in order to recover. See
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
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Having achieved the perfect fix for all the problems with privacy tort
law,107 we can turn to the privacy statutes. Here too, a privacy tort model seems
poised to offer results that are reasonably predictable and efficient. This Article
has already shown how the Privacy Act and FOIA might be interpreted through
a privacy tort law prism. Overlaying such an approach onto the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and other
landmark pieces of privacy legislation makes sense too. Certainly, privacy tort
law has been spared the withering criticism to which ECPA's obsolete
medium-based privacy hierarchy has been subjected. 08
The thornier issues arise as we contemplate those privacy harms that are
not easily remedied through existing tort law. At first glance a unified privacy
tort might have a hard time dealing with issues like data mining, behavioral
marketing, telemarketing, social networking websites, or location-aware
smartphones. But there have been many opportunities presented for judges to
address these problems via tort rules. In some cases that might compromise an
individual's safety, such as sales of personal information by data brokers, the
courts have been willing to expand tort liability to regulate the dangerous
conduct.'0 9 But in the majority of cases, the courts have understood themselves
to be junior partners to legislators and regulators in dealing with new privacy
challenges. 110 The possibility that legislators might want to legislate has
convinced the courts to stop innovating through common law. And the
unwillingness of judges to modernize tort protections to deal with new
challenges has prompted legislators in turn to legislate in ad hoc, often
incoherent ways.

107.
108.

I am kidding.
For a few examples of ECPA-bashing, see Fredrick M. Joyce & Andrew E. Bigart,

Liberty for All, Privacyfor None: The Conundrum of ProtectingPrivacy Rights in a Pervasively
Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1481, 1495 (2007) ("A random sampling of cases involving

alleged violations of the ECPA and other electronic privacy laws reveals a crazy-quilt of factspecific outcomes. There is no unitary theme to these case precedents; they offer little practical
guidance to those who engage in electronic communications and to those who are entrusted to
protect electronic communications and records."); Patricia M. Worthy, The Impact of New and
Emerging Telecommunications Technologies: A Call to the Rescue of the Attorney-Client

Privilege, 39 How. L.J. 437, 450 (1996) ("The attempt by Congress, through the enactment of
ECPA, to recognize and effectuate policy for the new and emerging technologies, served only to
create irrational categories of protected communications.") (footnote omitted); President's
Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE
CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL

CONDUCT

INVOLVING

THE USE

OF THE INTERNET

III.D.l.,

(March 2000) ("[A]dvances in
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm
telecommunications technology have made the language of the statute obsolete.").
109. Adler v. Vision Lab Telecommc'ns, 393 F. Supp.2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2005); Remsburg
v. Docusearch, 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
110. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995); Shibley v.
Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).

2010]

RE UNIFYING PRIVACY LAW

2035

In principle, the great privacy innovations of the twentieth century-like
the Fair Information Practices-can be incorporated into privacy tort law.111
Tort law could simply require entities that hold personal information about
individuals to: disclose the presence of dossiers to data privacy subjects if
asked about them; provide opportunities for data privacy subjects to correct
errors in those dossiers when they can show that such information is indeed
erroneous; obtain the subject's informed consent when sensitive data is
transferred to another entity for another purpose; and take reasonable
precautions to safeguard personal data against misuse or theft. To the extent
that these obligations exist at all in U.S. law, they are statutory, but there is no
reason why they could not be part of the common law.112 Indeed, common law
adjudication might permit the seamless and rapid application of the Fair
Information Practices principles to new kinds of privacy threats like Facebook
Beacon or Google Buzz.
Of course, it is always possible that Congress will endeavor to reunify
privacy law via comprehensive privacy legislation. As Paul Schwartz and KarlNikolaus Peifer's wonderful article in this volume makes clear, Germany has
embraced a largely coherent vision of privacy law grounded in the right of
personality.11 3 There is an effort underway in the Australian legislature to enact
such legislation, and the pending Australian legislation that would replace that
country's existing Privacy Act consciously attempts to create parity between
the demands placed on the public sector and those imposed on the private
sector.1 14 In the last Congress, two pieces of legislation, the Boucher Bill and
the Rush Bill, were introduced. Neither was enacted. Both bills were described
as comprehensive privacy legislation.'l1 While these bills tackled consumer
privacy issues that are largely unregulated, it was inaccurate to describe them
as comprehensive privacy bills. They attempted to regulate practices
concerning data retention, data security, and transfers of privacy legislation.
111. For a discussion of the Fair Information Practices, and their applicability to
contemporary privacy challenges, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999).

112. Of course, it could well be that some of the harms emphasized by the Fair Information
Practices are discrete, collective harms that are suffered by very large numbers of people. Such
harms may appear less salient in a tort case, when an individual claimant is seeking relief.
Mechanisms for aggregating such dispersed claims, such as class action suits, have well-known
flaws.
113. Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser'sPrivacy and the German Right of
Personality:Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1925

(2010).
114. See Karin Clark, Two Senate Enquiries into the Protection of Privacy in Australia,
THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW OF IP & MEDIA LAW, http://fortnightlyreview.info/2010/07/15/two-

senate-enquiries-into-the-protection-of-privacy-in-australial (last visited Aug. 11, 2010); Exposure
Draft, Australian Privacy Principles, SPECIAL MINISTER OF STATE, http://www.smos.gov.au/

media/201 0/docs/privacy-reform-exp-draft-part- 1.pdf.
115.

Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, ContractualNature of Online Policies Remain

Unsettled, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10, 2010.
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But numerous privacy issues remained well beyond their scope. These bills
would have brought more coherence to some aspects of privacy law, but they
made no attempt to engage in anything like the reunification project described
in this Article.
There is no principled reason why a future Congress could not attempt to
enact truly comprehensive privacy legislation, preempting inconsistent state
laws and amending the various existing federal privacy frameworks to achieve
coherence. Yet there are a number of pragmatic reasons why such a step is
unlikely. Existing legislative frameworks create constituencies that would resist
changes that might take away victories hard won in past legislatures. Public
choice dynamics push legislatures away from efficient sets of rules and toward
systems that reward discrete, well-organized interest groups. Legislators strive
for compromises, not analytical elegance. If Schwartz and Peifer's claim that
Americans are less inclined than Germans toward theoretical unification and
philosophical rigor is right,l 16 then the tendency is surely more pronounced in
our legislators than our jurists.
VI.
THE DESIRABILITY OF COHERENCE IN PRIVACY LAW

Coherence in privacy law is basically achievable. The question remains
whether such coherence is normatively desirable. The answer is yes, for two
reasons.
First, coherent law lowers the compliance costs for individuals and
organizations. Just as firms doing business in a number of markets typically
prefer that the laws of various jurisdictions be harmonized, they will also prefer
that the different common law and statutory frameworks governing their
conduct direct them to similar ends. A modern firm like Google or Microsoft
will have on staff lawyers who deal regularly with ECPA, FACTA, HIPAA,
CFAA, CALEA, COPPA, FERPA, CAN-SPAM, and FISA, plus common law
torts and European Union privacy directives. Government lawyers may need to
familiarize themselves with each of these statutory frameworks, as well as the
Privacy Act, FOIA, and the constitutional right of information privacy.
Safeguarding privacy interests is most cost effective when the provisions in this
alphabet soup do not conflict with one another, and when knowledge about one
privacy system can be leveraged to help understand another. When FOIA
privacy and Privacy Act privacy mean different things, and FOIA penalizes
nondisclosure but the Privacy Act penalizes disclosure, government lawyers
necessarily find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place. Incoherent
law is inefficient law. It is expensive law. It is confusing law that may lead
even skilled and industrious lawyers astray.

116.

Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 113.
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Second, the complexity and fragmentation of privacy law limits the gains
available in common law adjudication. When courts treat Privacy Act law,
FOIA privacy, or privacy tort law as a walled garden, they require that wheels
be reinvented and they enhance uncertainty among private parties trying to
figure out how to conform their behavior to the law's requirements. There are
inevitably issues about what counts as private that arise first in FOIA privacy
law, but that will ultimately arise in tort, and vice versa. When courts deem the
law of FOIA privacy off limits for privacy tort purposes they necessarily
impoverish the case law of helpful precedents.
The product of all this is an environment where judges have a relatively
free hand to reunify privacy law selectively, quite possibly in a results-oriented
way. Take the question of whether an individual has a privacy interest in his
residential address. FOIA says that such an interest exists and the government
can withhold the addresses of federal workers.1 7 Privacy tort law says that the
interest does not exist and there is no civil liability for disclosing the home
address of an individual.' 18 In a Ninth Circuit constitutional right to information
privacy case challenging Megan's Law, the court cited only the tort precedents
to hold that ex-offenders had no protected privacy interest in their addresses."
In a Third Circuit constitutional right to information privacy case challenging
Megan's Law, the court cited only the FOIA privacy precedents to hold that exoffenders possessed a protected privacy interest in their home addresses.120
Once again, this sort of incoherence goes unrecognized whenever we excuse
privacy law's fragmentation.121
Nonetheless, incoherence has its benefits. Information privacy law is a
complex system, and it is worth thinking through the dangers that might be
posed if the law becomes uniform. One is the danger of assuming that all
contexts are alike. If people inevitably and correctly regard the disclosure of
their private information to the state and civil society very differently, then
trying to create coherence between the legal systems governing these disparate
threats will be misguided. Alternatively, we might worry that the law is
coherent but wrong. If mistakes in the Privacy Act are immediately duplicated
in privacy tort law or FOIA privacy law, then the damage from the initial
mistake will be magnified. These concerns are closely related, and judges are
the stopgap in both instances. Courts must be able to recognize when an
analogy breaks down, and must continue to do what the common law tradition
117. U.S. Dep't ofDef. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994).
118. Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
119. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997).
120. Paul P. v. Vemiero, 170 F.3d 396, 403-04 (3d Cir. 1999).
121. It is coherent to conclude that society should give greater respect to federal
employees' privacy interests in their home addresses than to sex offenders' privacy interests in
their home addresses. But that would result from the greater societal interest in disseminating the
information, not the sex offenders' lesser interest in privacy. This is the most charitable reading of
PaulP.'s holding, which does uphold Megan's Law. Id. at 404.
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asks of them-scrutinize precedents from peer and inferior courts carefully,
follow them when appropriate, and reject them when their premises have been
falsified or when their analysis does not persuade.
VII.
CAN NELSON FOLLOW M4YNARD?
Let us conclude by considering two striking contemporary developments
in American privacy law. On August 6, 2010, not long before this Article went
to press, the D.C. Circuit, in a tour de force opinion by Judge Ginsburg, went
farther toward the reunification of information privacy law than any court to
date. United States v. Maynard raised the question of whether the warrantless
twenty-four-hour monitoring of a criminal suspect's travels for four
consecutive weeks via GPS amounts to a search under the Fourth
Amendment.' 22 The court held that such monitoring did violate the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had
reserved the question whether "dragnet-type" warrantless twenty-four-hour
surveillance would violate the Constitution in an earlier case that had
authorized the use of beepers to monitor the movements of a suspect's
vehicle.123
The Maynard opinion's embrace of a coherent body of information
privacy law was more complete than anything written since Warren and
Brandeis's time. The opinion cited Reporters Committee for the view that the
sum of the whole could be greater than the sum of the parts where threats to
privacy were concerned, and Reporters Committee's logic is relatively
satisfying in contexts like this one that do not implicate free speech interests.124
Thus, the difference between pervasive twenty-four-hour GPS monitoring over
four weeks and short-term GPS monitoring for a few days would be far more
than merely a matter of degree. In addition to citing various state and federal
Fourth Amendment cases on GPS surveillance, and state statutes requiring the
use of a warrant before GPS monitoring can occur,125 the opinion analyzed at
some length precedents from tort law, including landmark tortious intrusion
upon seclusion cases like Galella v. Onassis and Nader v. General Motors.126

Both those opinions noted the privacy dangers posed by overzealous
surveillance in public places that provided the subject with no opportunity to
escape by blending in with the crowd. Continuing in that vein, the Maynard
court emphasized the extent to which twenty-hour extended surveillance could
122.
123.
124.

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 556 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
Id. at 561.

125.

Id. at 562-65.

126. Id. at 562-63 (citing Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) and Nader
v. General Motors, 25 N.Y.2d 560 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)). While free speech
interests are not implicated, public safety interests are, meaning that applying Reporters
Committee is controversial here too.
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reveal sensitive facts about an individual that would not be discernable through
fleeting monitoring:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by
short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what
he does not do, and what he does ensemble.

. .

. Repeated visits to a

church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single
visit, as does one's not visiting any of these places over the course of a
month. The sequence of a person's movements can reveal still more; a
single trip to a gynecologist's office tells little about a woman, but that
trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby store tells a
different story. A person who knows all of another's travels can
deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular
at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical
treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts. 127
This sophisticated analysis is more similar in substance to the sort of thinking
that courts have historically done in privacy tort cases than in Fourth
Amendment cases. But the Maynard court is implicitly asking a very fine
question, which is: "why should there be any difference between these bodies
of information privacy law?"
The second great innovation in Maynard,another that was borrowed from
privacy tort law, is the idea that real-world resource constraints color an
individual's reasonable expectations of privacy. As I explained in A Social
Networks Theory ofPrivacy, tort law typically analyzes expectations of privacy
through a probabilistic lens. If it is theoretically possible, but extraordinarily
unlikely, that information shared with a few individuals will ultimately become
widely known by the public, then privacy tort law usually discounts the
theoretical possibility and holds that the data privacy subject maintains a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 128
Some Fourth Amendment cases do the same thing. For example, in Kyllo
v. UnitedStates, the Court held that a homeowner had a reasonable expectation
that technologies not in general public use would not be employed by the police
to gather information about the interior of a home, but could harbor no such
expectation as to technologies that were commonly used by members of the
public.129 And in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that pregnant
women retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their urine samples that
were collected at a state hospital, such that samples that tested positive for
cocaine could not be turned over to the police as a matter of course.1 3 0 The
Court reached this conclusion even though state law sometimes required health

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id at 562.
Strahilevitz, supra note 80, at 939-46.
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
532 U.S. 67, 76 n.9 (2001).
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professionals to inform the police of evidence of criminal conduct they
obtained while providing medical care to their patients.' 31 While both cases
remain good law, the more common approach in Fourth Amendment cases is
the third-party doctrine, which holds that individuals who share information
with anyone should expect that it will be shared with the government,
regardless of the ex ante probability that such sharing will in fact occur.132
The Maynard court borrowed from tort reasoning and took the idea of
"reasonable expectations of privacy" far more literally than cases applying the
third-party doctrine do.
[T]he information the police discovered in this case - the totality of
Jones's movements over the course of a month - was not exposed to
the public: . . . unlike one's movements during a single journey, the
whole of one's movements over the course of a month is not actually
exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe those
movements is effectively nil.133
In footnotes, the court emphasized an article written in this law review in 1954
by the Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department noting that constant
surveillance is "not only more costly than any police department can afford, but
in the vast majority of cases it is impossible."l 34
The question of whether Fourth Amendment "reasonable expectations of
privacy" should resemble the reasonable expectations of privacy that are
referenced in tort law and many other areas of information privacy law is a
difficult one. Several factors make the question a hard one. I will flag two here.
First, as a historical matter the Fourth Amendment's enactment preceded the
Warren and Brandeis privacy revolution. Second, the dramatic nature of the
exclusionary rule remedy-which may result in a guilty perpetrator walking
free-may make courts especially resistant to conclusions that reasonable
expectations of privacy exist, even in those settings where they would be less
hostile to finding a reasonable expectation in the context of interactions
between non-state actors.135 These reasons, and others that I hope to explore at
greater length elsewhere, warrant against blindly translating "reasonable
expectations of privacy" that have been recognized in tort to Fourth
Amendment contexts. Conspicuously, I do not advocate reunifying the Fourth
Amendment with privacy tort law here.

131.
132.
133.

Id. at 78 n.13.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

134. Id. at 565 n.7 (citing W.H. Parker, Surveillance by Wiretap or Dictograph: Threat or
Protection?, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 727, 734 (1954)).
135.
For helpful discussion, see Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws
in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 119 (2002);
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Maynard, though, does not take the position that reasonable expectations
of privacy in tort law, FOIA, and other non-Fourth Amendment contexts are the
same as those arising under the Fourth Amendment. It only takes the position
that such precedents are instructive, and can be used to get a handle on the
Fourth Amendment issues presented by relatively novel technologies. In that
sense it is a model of common-law judging, drawing on existing domestic
precedents, and scrutinizing them to see how analogous they are to the case at
hand. To be sure, GPS surveillance of vehicles is an issue about which people's
actual expectations of privacy are in flux. New applications are being
developed daily for GPS-enabled smartphones, and many consumers seem
eager to broadcast information about their movements.136 In the near future
practical anonymity of drivers on roadways may be eroded by crowd-sourced
"How's My Driving?" technologies, and there are many reasons to believe that,
on balance, this loss of motorist anonymity would be a good thing.137
Reasonable minds therefore might quarrel with the result in Maynard, but the
methodology is a genuine breakthrough, and exactly the sort of thing I have in
mind when I advocate information privacy law's reunification.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will follow in the D.C. Circuit's footsteps.
There is a golden opportunity to do so this Term. On March 8, 2010, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in NASA v. Nelson. To privacy scholars, this
was a stunning turn of events. It has been thirty-three years since the Supreme
Court has said a word about the constitutional right to information privacy. But
Nelson is a case in which the constitutional information privacy claims are the
only issues present on appeal. In granting certiorari, the court accepted an
invitation by Chief Judge Kozinski, whose dissent from the denial of a
rehearing en banc ended as follows:
[T]here are circumstances when a well-worn doctrine can grow into "a
vexing thicket of precedent" that then becomes "difficult for litigants
to follow and for district courts-and ourselves-to apply with
consistency." . . . The back and forth between the panel and my

dissenting colleagues illustrates that we have reached this point with
the doctrine of informational privacy. Though I am sympathetic to the
arguments of my dissenting colleagues, it's not clear that the panel has
misapplied circuit law; when the law is so subjective and amorphous,
it's difficult to know exactly what a misapplication might look like.
It's time to clear the brush. An en banc court is the only practical way
we have to do it. We didn't undertake that chore today, but we'll have
to sooner or later, unless the Supreme Court should intervene. 138
136.

See, e.g., Miguel Helft & Jenna Wortham, Facebook Unveils a Service to Announce

Where Users Are, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/19/technology/
19facebook.html.
137.
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Intervene it has. In these last few pages, I want to recommend a concrete way
for the Court to clear the brush and bring some semblance of sanity to the
constitutional right of information privacy, and to information privacy law
more generally. By working our way through Nelson itself, we can see ways in
which the law of privacy might be reunified. In this case, that means
recognizing that the constitutional right to information may have to disappear.
Nelson involves the federal government's use of detailed background
checks to investigate the suitability of Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
employees for continued employment. The plaintiffs represent a class of JPL
scientists, engineers, and administrators who are classified by NASA as "low
risk" employees because their jobs "do not involve policymaking, major
program responsibility, public safety, duties demanding a significant degree of
public trust, or access to financial records with significant risk of causing
damage or realizing personal gain."1 39 Under new federal regulations, even
longtime JPL employees were to be subjected to background checks in which
government agents would ask employees, their references, their prior
employers, and their landlords questions about whether they had: used drugs or
undergone treatment or counseling for drug addiction in the last year; used
abusive language; been involved in personality conflicts; developed mental,
emotional, psychological, or psychiatric issues; or engaged in sodomy. In
addition, third parties would be asked whether they knew anything, good or
bad, about the JPL employees that would be relevant to their ability to work for
the government. 14 0 The applicable guidelines stated that having engaged in
sodomy did not present problems with respect to suitability for government
employment, but that investigators were to examine employees' susceptibility
to coercion or blackmail based on their having engaged in sodomy. 141
The district court denied the plaintiffs request for an injunction, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed with respect to the government's inquiries about drug
treatment (as opposed to drug use) and open-ended "investigation[s] of the
most private aspects of class members' lives." 42 While the court held that the
government's inquiries into its employees' backgrounds were legitimate, it
applied intermediate scrutiny and held that the government's investigations
were not narrowly tailored to further these legitimate interests.1 43 The court
emphasized the fact that the background checks were to be applied, not only to
job applicants, but to employees who had performed admirably for decades at
JPL, which the court thought greatly magnified the privacy harm. 1 "

from the denial of rehearing en banc).
139. Id at 1029 n.3 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
140. Id. at 1032-33.
141. Id. at 1033.
142. Id. at 1032; Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 879 (9th Cir. 2008).
143. Nelson, 568 F.3d at 1032.
144. Id at 1035, 1037.
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As the judges debated whether to consider the case en banc, several
disagreements emerged. The most important for the purposes of this Article
was the question of how privacy precedents from other branches of privacy law
jurisprudence should inform constitutional right of information privacy
doctrine. To one of the dissenters, Judge Callahan, a unified approach was
sensible:
The panel's opinion concludes that individuals have a constitutionally
protected right to privacy in information disclosed to third-party
employment references. No other court has held as much, and for good
reason-the Supreme Court consistently has held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.

. .

. Absent some privilege . . . an applicant does

not have an expectation of privacy to information disclosed by a
reference.
The panel concludes that Fourth Amendment case law defining
whether an individual has an expectation of privacy over information
that he has already disseminated to the public is not the proper focus in
the evaluation of information privacy rights and contends that, instead,
we should focus on the general nature of the information sought.
Although I agree with the panel that the constitutional right to
informational privacy is not limited to Fourth Amendment searches, I
disagree with the suggestion that whether an individual has an
expectation of privacy under a constitutional right to informational
privacy is not informed by Supreme Court case law interpreting an
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. In fact, one of
the Supreme Court's first decisions recognizing a constitutional right
to informational privacy specifically cited to Fourth Amendment case
law in defining this right.
The judges concurring in the denial of a rehearing, by contrast, insisted that the
Fourth Amendment third-party-doctrine cases provided no guidance in a
constitutional right to information privacy case. As they saw it:
[T]he right to informational privacy and Fourth Amendment rights are
not fully coextensive. . . . [A]lthough in the Fourth Amendment

context there is a general principle "that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties, 'the legitimate expectation of privacy' described in this context
is a term of art used only to define a search under the Fourth
Amendment, and Miller and Smith do not preclude an informational

privacy challenge to government questioning of third parties about
46
highly personal matters."1

145.
omitted).
146.
omitted).

Id. at 1044 (Callahan, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (citations
Id. at 1031 n.7 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (citations
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The back and forth between Judges Callahan and Wardlaw is deeply
unsatisfying. Judge Callahan says privacy law should be unified because the
Ninth Circuit should not do something inconsistent with what the Supreme
Court has done. Judge Wardlaw's response is that inconsistency with other
branches of privacy law is a non-issue. To her the only privacy cases that
matter are constitutional right to information privacy cases. While this Article
is sympathetic to Judge Callahan's premise that privacy law's different parts
ought to be consistent and coherent, her execution of the reunification project
leaves something to be desired. A more forceful expression of her view would
have emphasized the most counterintuitive aspect of the majority's holding,
which is that in a case involving overlap between the Fourth Amendment and
the constitutional right to information privacy, the right that the Supreme Court
has never embraced and that has only the faintest grounding in the
constitutional text would be the one that provides an aggrieved citizen with the
most robust and far-reaching constitutional protection.
That said, there is a large body of privacy law beyond the Fourth
Amendment, and it, too, has addressed the question of whether it is a violation
of privacy to ask an individual's friends and former employers about her past
behavior, her mental health issues, her sexual preferences and the like. The
issue has come up in tort cases, where some courts have held that such inquiries
do not amount to an intrusion upon seclusion. A leading American case that
embraces a "third party doctrine" approach to tort law is Nader v. General
Motors, in which the New York Court of Appeals held that General Motors'
very intrusive interviews of Ralph Nader's associates and friends were not an
intrusion upon seclusion.14 7 This was true even though General Motors' agents
misrepresented their purpose-claiming to be working on behalf of an entity
that was considering hiring Nader, when in actuality General Motors hoped to
intimidate or discredit the plucky young author of Unsafe at Any Speed.
Of course, the facts of Nelson arose in California, where privacy law has
by-and-large rejected Nader's extension of the third-party doctrine to tort
law.148 As it happens, California is the rare American jurisdiction where
privacy tort law and constitutional privacy law have essentially mergedthanks to the California Constitution's privacy clause, which lacks a state
action requirement.1 49 As a result, many privacy cases that could be brought
147. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
148. For a lengthier discussion of the case law, see Strahilevitz, supra note 80, at 939-46.
149. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."); Huntingdon
Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 546 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (noting that the state constitution protects against invasions of privacy by state and nonstate actors). The merger of constitutional and tort privacy protections in California is a recent
phenomenon, which Huntingdon hinted at and a more recent case confirmed. Compare the 1998
case of Shulman v. Group WProds., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 487 (Cal. 1998) ("Nothing in Hill or our
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under a tort theory are brought under the state constitution, and the welfarist
balancing test that Judge Posner subtly introduced in Desnick has been
explicitly embraced in the doctrine.15o
Some of those cases interpreting the California Constitution do embrace a
result that is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Nelson. For example,
the California Supreme Court held in 1986 that requiring public employees to
submit to polygraph testing in order to investigate a specific crime violated the
employees' privacy rights under the state constitution.15 Another 1991
opinion, albeit one that was mooted on appeal, held that Target's use of a
"Psychscreen" program, a psychological profiling device that required job
applicants to answer questions about their religious beliefs and sexual
orientation, violated the applicants' rights under the California Constitution. 15 2
On the other hand, a 1994 California Supreme Court case found that the
NCAA's drug testing of collegiate athletes did not violate the California
Constitution's privacy protections, though that opinion did focus on the
peculiarities of athletic competition and reserved judgment on how its ruling
should apply to workplace settings. 53 Moreover, the state courts have rejected
one of the central rhetorical arguments put forward by the Nelson court, which
is that employees have much stronger privacy protections than mere job
seekers.154 It is strange that the California and federal constitutions should
differ on such a question. Fascinatingly, the Nelson panel opinion engaged in
essentially no exploration of applicable state law while exploring the federal
constitutional question.
This review of the case law brings us to a surprising place. Were anyone
other than the federal government the defendant, the plaintiffs in Nelson could
have prevailed had they pursued a tort or constitutional claim. Under California
tort law, sharing information with friends and associates does not necessarily
waive reasonable expectations of privacy against the information being shared
with outsiders.155 And under closely connected state constitutional law,
more recent constitutional privacy cases, however, suggests that the conceptual framework
developed for resolving privacy claims was intended to supplant the common law tort analysis or
preclude its independent development.") with the 2009 case of Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. 211
P.3d 1063, 1073-74 (Cal. 2009) ("The right to privacy in the California Constitution set standards
similar to the common law tort of intrusion. . . . We will assess the parties' claims and the
undisputed evidence under the rubric of both the common law and constitutional tests for
establishing a privacy violation. Borrowing certain shorthand language from Hill, which distilled
the largely parallel elements of these two causes of action, we consider (1) the nature of any
intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy, and (2) the offensiveness or seriousness of the
intrusion, including any justification and other relevant interests.").
150.
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employers are likely prohibited from asking questions about sexual orientation,
and perhaps about drug treatment as well. Of course, thanks to the federal
Constitution's Supremacy Clause, a state constitutional claim challenging the
federal regulations is a non-starter. Plaintiffs could still sue the federal government under a tort theory, given the sovereign immunity waiver in the Federal
Tort Claims Act.'5 In light of the California Supreme Court's recent holding
that state tort law and the California Constitution provide equivalent protection,
the expansive precedents arising under the state constitution could be employed
by a plaintiff suing under the Tort Claims Act. But discretionary function
immunity would almost certainly permit the government to escape liability.' 57
The Supreme Court may well decide in Nelson that there is no such thing
as a constitutional right to information privacy. The Sixth Circuit has said as
much, and the D.C. Circuit has leaned in that direction, though every other
circuit court to consider the issue has come out the other way. An abolitionist
approach would view the sorts of harms to privacy interests that arose in
Nelson as ordinary tort harms that are appropriately pursued through ordinary
tort causes of action. To be sure, under the Federal Torts Claims Act's due care
doctrine a tort cause of action against the federal government on the facts of
Nelson is a probable loser, but that reflects a congressional judgment about the
sorts of government actions that ought not to engender liability. The primary
appeal of removing these questions from constitutional law relates to errorcorrection: if the judges make a mistake in deciding difficult, subjective
questions of privacy law in areas where the law, technology, and norms are in a
constant state of flux, or if the legislature immunizes conduct that the citizenry
believes ought to be actionable, those errors can be fixed via ordinary
legislation at the state or federal level rather than through the cumbersome
processes of amending the federal Constitution or changing the composition of
the Court through appointments.
In contrast to Nelson and Whalen many of the landmark constitutional
right to information privacy cases involve state governmental defendants and
could have been brought under a state tort or state constitutional theory. One
prominent example would be a case like Doe v. Borough of Barrington.'5 In
that case, an arrestee with bleeding lesions disclosed his HIV-positive status to
police officers taking him into custody so that they could take appropriate
precautions to protect themselves from infection. A member of the same police
department subsequently and improperly informed the arrestee's neighbors of
his HIV status. A panic ensued, causing various neighbors to pull nineteen
156. Qualified immunity would not present a significant obstacle to the suit, at least where
the law was reasonably well developed. See Castro v. United States, 34 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.
1994).
157. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006); Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 652-54
(4th Cir. 2005).
158. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).
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children out of the public school attended by the arrestee's children for fear of
them contracting the disease through casual conduct. A media report on the
panic then disclosed Doe's real name.
The court understandably ruled in Doe's favor, and Barrington is included
as a principal constitutional right to information privacy case in Solove and
Schwartz's privacy law casebook. 1o But Doe did bring pendent state tort
invasion of privacy claims under New Jersey law, 16 1 and those claims would
have fared well, given the defendants' apparent lack of good faith in exercising
their official duties.162 The New Jersey Tort Claims Act permits causes of
action for invasion of privacy to be asserted against the government.163 And
New Jersey, along with most states, recognizes the tort for public disclosure of
private facts. 164 A plaintiff would have less luck in a jurisdiction like North
Carolina, which prohibits invasion of privacy tort suits against the state and
which lacks a California-style state constitutional provision to permit tort-like
claims to proceed in the state courts.
In any event, the approach of killing off the constitutional right of
information privacy creates what I call the Bobby Ewing dilemma. The
television show Dallas's entire eighth season, which followed the death of
protagonist Bobby Ewing, was revealed to be a mere dream sequence. After
Patrick Duffy (who played Bobby) agreed to return to the show, his
wife/widow awoke to find her husband in the shower, delighted to learn that
she had dreamed an entire season's worth of melodramatic content. Viewers of
the show were less pleased.
In two 1977 cases, the U.S. Supreme Court devoted pages and pages of
the U.S. Reports to discussing the constitutional right to information privacy
before deciding that neither the Whalen plaintiff nor Richard Nixon had a
winning case under the right. In the decades since, the appellate courts have
considered hundreds of cases involving the right and developed a great deal of
(unsatisfying) doctrine in an effort to flesh it out. Declaring the non-existence
of such a right after all this time will look bad, even if the right in question is
one about which the legal profession and general public know little.
The basic question presented in Nelson, then, is who should decide on the
remedies for government conduct that would be tortious if engaged in by a
private party. The Nelson panel thought that the federal courts interpreting the
federal Constitution should decide, whereas Judge Callahan's dissent implies
that these questions should be addressed to Congress, the state courts, and state
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legislatures. Superficially, either approach can be squared with an attempt to
reunify privacy law. A more persuasive version of the panel's "preservationist"
approach would view state tort law (and state constitutional law, in California)
as persuasive authority with respect to the question of what the federal
Constitution should mean. This achieves coherence in the law of any particular
place, but does create the disturbing side effect that the federal Constitution
would be more protective in some jurisdictions than others because of
variations in tort law. We would just be replacing incoherence with reified
inconsistency.166 Having said that, if common law tort precedents are permitted
to influence constitutional rights, then many of the ordinary concerns about
creating constitutional rules when statutory or common law rules will suffice
are blunted. The abolitionist approach, by contrast, would create coherence by
withdrawing the federal Constitution from the domain of information privacy
protections-leaving federal statutes, state tort laws, and state constitutional
doctrine to remedy (or refuse to remedy) these sorts of claims.
For the sake of coherence, and to promote the development of tort law,
statutory, or state constitutional remedies, it would be best to end the
constitutional right to information privacy experiment. But if the Court must
breathe new life into the prodigal constitutional right, it could adopt a "second
best" approach-treating the constitutional right as a gap filler in those settings
where federal statutory or state law remedies are unavailable for serious
wrongs. The tort inquiry would either inform the constitutional inquiry, as in
City of Artesia, or become fully harmonized with the constitutional inquiry,
which seems to have happened under the California Constitution's right to
privacy. Under such an approach, the Constitution would prompt the courts
to ask variations on the familiar tort questions: Has the government infringed
upon its employees' private matters or concerns? Is the government's conduct a
clear violation of existing social norms? Does the gravity of the privacy harm
to the plaintiffs and those similarly situated exceed the societal benefits?
Affirmative answers to all three questions would point toward the violation of
the constitutional right. In the process, the law of information privacy would be
judged toward uniformity through the creation of a federal right with content
that did not vary by jurisdiction. Thirty-three years is a long time for an
experiment, and enough time to determine that the experiment has not turned
out well. Chao suggested that the Supreme Court was interested in beginning
the project of returning coherence to information privacy law, and Nelson can
provide further momentum for the long overdue rationalization of American
privacy law.
166. I use the word "reified" because constitutional rights presently do vary between, say,
the Sixth Circuit, which recognizes no constitutional right of information privacy, and most other
circuits, which do. See supra text accompanying note 28.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47 (discussing Artesia) and note 149
(discussing the cases interpreting the California Constitution).

